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We construct a multiple-shock version of the Mortensen-Pissarides labor market search 
model to investigate the basic model’s well-known tendency to underpredict the volatil-
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labor productivity, job separation, and matching or “allocative” effciency. Although our 
multiple-shock model generates some more volatility, it has counterfactual implications 
for the cyclicality of unemployment and vacancies. Our second exercise forces the model 
to be the data-generating process to uncover the necessary realizations of all three shocks. 
We show that the Mortensen-Pissarides labor market search model requires signiﬁ  cantly 
procyclical and volatile matching efﬁ  ciency and job separations to simultaneously ac-
count for high procyclical variations in job  nding probabilities as well as relatively small 
net employment changes in the data. Hence, the model is more fundamentally ﬂ  awed than 
its inability to amplify shocks would suggest. We also show that variation in job sepa-
rations accounts for most of the employment ﬂ  uctuations, suggesting that endogenous 
separations could be the key feature of an improved model. This leads us to conclude that 
the model lacks mechanisms to generate procyclical matching efﬁ  ciency and labor force 
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job-to-job transitions are promising avenues of research.
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There is now a fairly rich literature using the Mortensen-Pissarides labor market search model
to understand business cycle movements in the labor markets.1 Shimer (2005a) has recently
criticized this model, arguing that it requires implausibly large shocks to labor productivity to
generate substantial variation in the key variables of unemployment, vacancies, and the vacancy
to unemployment ratio.2 We explore whether other reasonable sources of exogenous variation,
including job separation and matching e¢ ciency shocks, can satisfactorily resolve this puzzle.
In particular, we identify the realizations of a multiple-shock process required for the model to
￿t the data perfectly. Our results are striking. The perfect-￿t experiment strongly indicates
that the standard labor market search model is more fundamentally ￿ awed than its inability to
amplify shocks would suggest.
Our multiple shock approach allows for exogenous shocks to the rate of job separation, labor
productivity, and matching e¢ ciency that are mutually correlated over the business cycle. In
keeping with the most basic Mortensen-Pissarides model, the rate of job separation is exogenous
and simply gives the fraction of employed persons that will separate from their jobs, for whatever
reason, during a particular period. The shock to the matching function captures the e¢ ciency
with which existing labor market institutions pair searching workers with available jobs. We
call this the "allocative e¢ ciency" shock as in Andolfatto (1996). We use data on monthly
separation and job ￿nding probabilities as well as unemployment and job vacancies to estimate
the process that governs these shocks. The estimation strategy provides us with empirically
plausible variations in labor market transition probabilities of the average U.S. worker.
Although realistic variation in the transition probabilities substantially increases the volatil-
1For a textbook treatment of this class of models see Pissarides (2000). Broadly speaking, we can identify
two separate but closely related strands in this literature. The ￿rst group, including works by Andolfatto
(1996), den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000) and Merz (1995, 1999), incorporates labor market search into
otherwise standard real business cycle environments to improve upon their cyclical implications for labor market
variables such as employment. A second group of papers, such as Cole and Rogerson (1999) and Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994), focuses on the implications of the standard labor market search model in relation to the
empirical evidence on job creation and job destruction provided by Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) and Davis,
Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996).
2Earlier studies either failed to address the magnitude of the exogenous forcing process (Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994), Cole and Rogerson (1999)) or implied a counterfactually positive relationship between unem-
ployment and vacancies (Andolfatto (1996), Merz (1995)). Merz (1995) provides two versions of the model, one
with constant and one with variable search e⁄ort. To be precise, her version with variable search e⁄ort gives
this counterfactual ￿nding.
2ity of key variables in the model, it does so at an enormous descriptive cost. The simulated
cyclical behavior of unemployment and vacancies is entirely counterfactual, displaying procycli-
cal unemployment and countercyclical job vacancies. We conduct a "perfect-￿t" experiment to
better understand the counterfactual ￿nding. That is, we posit the model as the actual data-
generating process and then infer the shocks that would be required to match the data perfectly.
Our ￿ndings are startling. To be consistent with the observed ￿ uctuations in unemployment and
job vacancies, the multiple-shock model requires volatile procyclical job separations to reconcile
sharply procyclical variation in job ￿nding with relatively small net employment changes.
These counterfactual ￿ndings from the perfect-￿t experiment are due to two reasons. First,
the substantial ￿ uctuations observed in the vacancy-unemployment ratio, or ￿labor market
tightness,￿require the multiple-shock model to have signi￿cantly procyclical and volatile alloca-
tive e¢ ciency shocks. Given the cyclical behavior of allocative e¢ ciency, however, observed net
employment changes require signi￿cantly procyclical and substantially volatile job separations.
Of course, procyclical job separation and destruction runs contrary to the existing empirical
evidence on employment ￿ ows (Blanchard and Diamond (1990), Davis and Haltiwanger (1992),
Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996), and Shimer (2005a)). Therefore, the defects in the labor
market search model are even more fundamental than Shimer (2005a) argues. Furthermore,
these ￿ aws are robust to di⁄erent calibrations.
We conclude that the basic model lacks su¢ ciently strong mechanisms to reallocate workers
over the course of the business cycle. Our results point to potentially productive extensions of
the basic model. If procyclical allocational e¢ ciency is thought inadequate, a priori, one then
searches for mechanisms that underlie this behavior, and modi￿es the model accordingly. The
results also indicate that any such modi￿cation must be accompanied by a theoretical expansion
of the pool of searching workers and the incorporation of job-to-job transitions.
This paper relates to various other studies. Our investigation into the mechanics of the stan-
dard labor market search model echoes Shimer￿ s (2005a) diagnostic exploration of Mortensen-
Pissarides framework. We argue that the model, even when it has substantial degrees of
freedom with multiple shocks and empirically plausible transition probabilities, has counterfac-
tual implications. Once we have emphasized this point with the experiment that requires our
model to be the actual data-generating process, we then study the unique realization of shocks
3that are required for a perfect ￿t. Although our objective for this experiment is diagnosis
rather than measurement, it is similar to the accounting exercises employed in Chari, Kehoe,
and McGrattan (2007) and Ingram, Kocherlakota, and Savin (1994). Our model is identical
to Merz (1995) except that we abstract from the capital stock. Finally, we discuss our ￿ndings
and several avenues for future research in conjunction with the literature that tries to resolve
the puzzle presented in Shimer (2005a).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines our version of the
Mortensen-Pissarides model. In Section 3, we brie￿ y describe the data and its basic statistical
properties. Section 4 discusses our calibration and presents the simulation results. Section 5
analyzes the simulation results and presents our perfect-￿t experiment. We also interpret our
￿ndings in the context of recent literature. Section 6 discusses some robustness issues. We
brie￿ y outline our conclusions and set a direction for future research in Section 7.
2 The Model
The economy is inhabited by a continuum of in￿nitely-lived worker/households distributed
uniformly along the unit interval; there is also a continuum of ￿rms. At the beginning of
each period, a worker is considered either employed or unemployed. The measure of employed
workers is denoted Nt; the measure of unemployed workers is the complement, Ut ￿ 1￿Nt. The





￿tU (Ct;Nt); 0 < ￿ < 1; (1)
where ￿ is the subjective discount factor. Following Merz (1995), the period utility function is
separable in consumption and employment, with







; ￿ > 0,
where ￿ de￿nes the wage elasticity of labor supply at a constant marginal utility of wealth (the
￿Frisch elasticity￿of labor supply).
Both workers and ￿rms must undergo a costly search process before jobs are created and
4output is produced. At the beginning of each period, each unemployed worker searches for a
job, expending ￿ consumption units in the process. Aggregate search costs incurred in period t
therefore equal ￿(1 ￿ Nt) consumption units. Firms create job vacancies, but only by expending
￿ units of output per vacancy per period, generating aggregate ￿recruiting￿costs equal to ￿Vt.
Here, as in the traditional Mortensen-Pissarides framework, all jobs must be posted as vacancies
before they can be ￿lled. Once a job is ￿lled, it produces output equal to Zt, generating
aggregate output
Yt = ZtNt; (2)
where Zt > 0 is the exogenously determined productivity of labor.
The matching function captures the labor market search frictions. The typical formulation
determines the number of job matches formed in a given period, M (Vt;Ut), as an increasing
function M of job vacancies, Vt, and the number of job seekers, Ut, where M exhibits con-
stant returns to scale. Like an aggregate production function, the matching function is a
useful reduced form that summarizes a host of complex technological constraints. At its core
lies the notion of labor market mismatch, ￿an empirical concept that measures the degree of
heterogeneity in the labor market across a number of dimensions, usually restricted to skills,
industrial sector, and location￿(Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). By this de￿nition, a higher
degree of mismatch frustrates the search process, thereby generating more unemployment in
the steady state. In this paper we consider the possibility that the e¢ ciency of matching varies
systematically over the business cycle, either due to changes in labor market composition, or
changes more technological in nature.3
Hence, to allow for ￿ uctuations in mismatch, we generalize the matching function to include
a multiplicative shock term, ￿t, such that the number of matches formed in period t is given by
Mt = ￿tM (Vt;Ut) = ￿tV ￿
t (1 ￿ Nt)
1￿￿ , (3)
where 0 < ￿ < 1; and ￿t is the period-t realization of an unobserved shock process. Increases in
￿t raise the number of matches formed, given the numbers of searching workers and available
positions. From a searching worker￿ s perspective, an increase in ￿t raises the probability of being
3Empirical work by Bowlus (1995) o⁄ers evidence that mismatch has cyclical charateristics.
5matched with a vacant position; from the perspective of a single ￿rm, it improves the chances
of ￿lling a vacancy. Consequently, ￿ uctuations in ￿t signify improvements or deteriorations in
the allocative e¢ ciency of the labor market.
As job matches form, others are dissolved. We assume that a fraction of existing matches, ￿t,
dissolve each period as the outcome of an exogenous stochastic process. The period-t change in
aggregate employment, i.e., the net employment ￿ ow, is hence de￿ned as the di⁄erence between
a period￿ s gross employment in￿ ow and gross employment out￿ ow:
Nt+1 ￿ Nt = Mt ￿ ￿tNt. (4)
Note that the unobserved shocks directly impact each stream of workers: the ￿ ow into employ-
ment by the allocative e¢ ciency term, ￿t, and the out￿ ow by the separation rate, ￿t.
The state of the economy in a given period (Nt;et) consists of the beginning-of-period em-
ployment level, Nt, and values of the unobserved and exogenous state vector, et = (Zt;￿t;￿t).
We make the standard Markovian assumption that allows agents to form expectations of future-
period quantities using only current-state knowledge. Given that state, the socially e¢ cient
allocation of employment, vacancies, and consumption, fNt+1;Vt;Ctg, solves the following
recursively-de￿ned social planner￿ s problem:
￿ (Nt;et) = max
Nt+1;Vt;Ct
fU (Ct;Nt) + ￿Et￿ (Nt+1;et+1)g (5)
subject to
Ct + ￿(1 ￿ Nt) + ￿Vt ￿ ZtNt (6)
Nt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿t)Nt + ￿tM (Vt;1 ￿ Nt); (7)
where ￿ (Nt;et) is the future-discounted social value of employment level Nt and the exogenous
state et. Equation (6) represents the period-t resource constraint, prohibiting the sum of cur-
rent expenditures on consumption, job search, and vacancy creation to exceed current output,
and equation (7) describes the trajectory of employment (4) with the matching function (3) de-
termining the current-period ￿ ow into employment. Finally, we assume that a VAR(1) process
governs the exogenous state et:
6et+1 = Aet + "t+1, E(""0) = ￿: (8)
The autoregressive process for exogenous shocks plays a key role in this paper. We will devise
a way to estimate this joint process below.
The corresponding ￿rst-order and envelope conditions imply an Euler equation describing
an intertemporally e¢ cient vacancy-posting scheme for the economy. Suppressing arguments






















equating the loss in welfare due to vacancy creation with its expected future social bene￿t. In
equation (9), 1
￿MV = ￿￿1 V
￿M gives the average duration of vacancies multiplied by the elasticity
of vacancies in matching, ￿ = V MV :
M . The left-hand side of (9), therefore, represents the utility
loss associated with a marginal increase in vacancies. The expected gain of the marginal vacancy,





gives the one-period-ahead net social bene￿t of an additional match formed in the current
period. The term Z0 equals the output ￿ owing from the match; ￿ represents the (constant)






the consumption value of the leisure foregone by the newly matched worker. In the basic
Mortensen-Pissarides setup this quantity is a constant, whereas we allow it to vary over the
business cycle.
The ￿nal term in braces represents the net future social bene￿t arising from the expected
persistence of a job match. Given that any single current-period match survives with probability





. The second term in this sum, ￿￿0M0
U, represents the future reduction in
the future job-￿nding rate,
￿M
U , due to the current depletion of the unemployment stock; the






Equations (6)￿ (9) characterize the socially optimal allocation of employment, vacancies, and
consumption given a joint distribution for the exogenous forcing variables or shocks: Zt, ￿t,
7and ￿t. The traditional Mortensen-Pissarides approach determines these quantities in a market
equilibrium, with the real wage determined as a Nash bargain between ￿rms and households.
The socially optimal allocation is supported by a similar market allocation mechanism provided
that: 1) asset markets are rich enough for households to diversify away employment risk, and
2) the relative bargaining power between households and ￿rms is such that the positive and
negative search externalities net out to zero.4 Although we do not take a position on the
precise nature of the allocation mechanism, we maintain that existing market and institutional
arrangements direct the realized allocation su¢ ciently close to the social optimum to establish
equations (6)￿ (9) as a useful instrument of measure.
3 The Data
Before proceeding to the estimation of shocks, we brie￿ y review the salient facts regarding the
observed aggregate U.S. labor market measures. Because the model does not require a labor
market participation decision for worker/households, we must choose whether to express our
employment and unemployment variables, Nt and Ut ￿ 1￿Nt, relative to the labor force or the
age 16-and-over population. Although there are valid arguments in favor of both normalizations,
we ￿nd that the choice does not a⁄ect our results, so we choose the labor force (employment
plus unemployment) as our reference population.5
In the absence of a long time series on actual job vacancies, we follow standard practice and
construct vacancies from the Conference Board￿ s help-wanted advertising index. The resulting
vacancy series, Vt, is also expressed per member of the labor force6. Also, since our model
abstracts from the capital accumulation decision, we must choose between aggregate output
and aggregate consumption ￿ a choice that re￿ ects our desire to preserve a consistent and
4Hosios (1990) determines the conditions under which the Pareto-optimum is supported as a decentralized
market equilibrium in a static environment; Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996) do the same in dynamic general
equilibrium settings. The market equilibrium in the current work closely follows those of Merz and Andolfatto.
5Speci￿cally, we use the unemployment rate (unemployed persons per member of the labor force) constructed
as a quarterly average of the seasonally adjusted monthly series from the Current Population Survey (CPS) of
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The civilian labor force measure is also provided by BLS as part of the
CPS. Both series can be downloaded from the CPS home page http://www.bls.gov/cps.
6We construct a vacancy series by multiplying two seasonally adjusted monthly series ￿the ratio of help-
wanted advertising to unemployed workers compiled by the Conference Board (downloaded as the variable
LHELX from the DRI Basic database), and the unemployment rate U (de￿ned above) ￿ and averaging the
monthly values to obtain the quarterly series. The commonly reported help-wanted advertising index is a scalar
transformation of this series.
8well-understood labor productivity measure and one that can be more readily compared to
those in other studies. Since the aggregate labor input, Nt; produces all goods and services,
including private investment goods and those purchased by the government, real GDP provides
the appropriate output measure. Therefore, consumption, Ct, is proxied by real GDP per
member of the labor force7. We divide this series by the seasonally adjusted civilian labor
force (averaged from monthly to quarterly), appropriately scaled, to express the variable in
year-2000 chained dollars per person. Time series data on Ut, Vt and Ct are constructed at the
quarterly frequency and run from 1951:1 to 2003:4.
We use real output per person in the nonfarm business sector as our productivity measure.
This particular series is chosen to ensure comparability with the recent literature. It is also a
natural way to think about productivity in the standard labor market search model8. Although
not strictly consistent with our model￿ s output de￿nition, we show later on that the productivity
series implied by the model lines up nearly perfectly with the BLS measure.
We also use U.S. labor market transition probabilities for our estimation process. These
probabilities were constructed by Shimer (2005a), but our discussion follows that of Shimer
(2005b). In accordance with Shimer (2005b), unemployment, u, and employment, e, form
the relevant labor market states, with the job ￿nding probability governing the rate at which a
worker switches from unemployment to employment, and the separation probability determining
the rate at which a worker switches from employment to unemployment.
Shimer￿ s (2005b) de￿nitions of job ￿nding and separation probabilities are as follows:










where in a given month t, Ut is the number of unemployed, Us
t is the number of workers
unemployed less than one month; and Et is the number of workers employed. These de￿nitions
7Real GDP (billions of chained 2000 dollars, seasonally adjusted annual rate) was downloaded from the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED II database at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPC.1
8This series is part of the BLS￿ s Major Sector Productivity and Costs program and is downloaded from the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED II database at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPC. It is
normalized to 100 for 1992.
9correct for the time aggregation bias in the job separation probability by allowing for the
possibility of short unemployment spells within a given month.
To aggregate monthly transition probabilities, we account for all possible histories of employ-
ment states within a quarter. The temporal aggregation of labor market transition probabilities
might imply di⁄erent cyclical features at various frequencies. The idea behind this argument is
simple. An unemployed worker at the beginning of a quarter can switch between employment
and unemployment before being counted as employed at the end of the quarter. This aggre-
gation implies four possible histories. Therefore, the quarterly job ￿nding probability of an
average worker will not only re￿ ect the cyclical features of monthly job ￿nding probabilities, but
also of monthly separation probabilities. Since we are interested in the cyclical properties of
labor market variables, it is vital for us to be precise in aggregating Shimer￿ s monthly transition
probabilities. We use the following aggregation:
Ft = (1 ￿ f(3￿(t￿1)+1)) ￿ (1 ￿ f(3￿(t￿1)+2)) ￿ f(3￿(t￿1)+3) + (12)





f(3￿(t￿1)+1) ￿ s(3￿(t￿1)+2) ￿ f(3￿(t￿1)+3) +





St = (1 ￿ s(3￿(t￿1)+1)) ￿ (1 ￿ s(3￿(t￿1)+2)) ￿ s(3￿(t￿1)+3) + (13)





s(3￿(t￿1)+1) ￿ f(3￿(t￿1)+2) ￿ s(3￿(t￿1)+3) +





Note the four possible histories implicit in (12) and (13). A simple averaging of monthly
probabilities ignores these di⁄erent experiences.
We summarize the key business cycle features of the data in Table 1. For transition prob-
10abilities, we report both averages of f￿ s and s￿ s and F￿ s and S￿ s to facilitate comparison with
Shimer (2005a). To describe the business-cycle variation in these quantities, we follow Shimer
(2005a) and remove the low-frequency trend in all variables implied by the Hodrick-Prescott
￿lter, using a smoothing parameter of 105. We apply this procedure to remove movements in
the aggregates induced by institutional and technological changes associated with job matching,
so that they are not spuriously assigned to the matching function instability that arises from
cyclical movements in labor market mismatch. Key business cycle features of the U.S. data
are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: U.S. DATA (Quarterly, 1951Q1-2003Q4)
u v v/u u!e u!e* e!u e!u* z**
Standard Dev. 0:190 0:202 0:381 0:117 0:059 0:075 0:118 0:020
Autocorrelation 0:938 0:947 0:946 0:910 0:916 0:731 0:870 0:889
Cross Correlations
u ￿0:894 ￿0:971 ￿0:949 ￿0:938 0:712 0:889 ￿0:417
v 0:974 0:898 0:908 ￿0:689 ￿0:852 0:369
v/u 0:948 0:948 ￿0:718 ￿0:893 0:402
u!e 0:990 ￿0:578 ￿0:841 0:406
u!e* ￿0:590 ￿0:840 0:414
e!u 0:910 ￿0:518
e!u* ￿0:546
* Quarterly transition probabilities aggregated as in (12) and (13).
** O¢ cial BLS labor productivity measure for the nonfarm business sector.
From Table 1, we observe that employment, vacancies, and the vacancy-unemployment
ratio are all strongly procyclical and persistent, while employment is strongly countercyclical
and persistent. These data also a¢ rm the Beveridge curve with a strong contemporaneous
correlation between vacancies and unemployment of ￿0:894. Note that unemployment and
vacancies are nearly 10 times more volatile than labor productivity, and the volatility of the
vacancy-unemployment ratio (market tightness) is extreme, with a standard deviation of 38
percent around its trend. Although these facts are mutually consistent with the qualitative
11predictions of the standard model, Table 1 also points out the model￿ s shortcomings as put
forth by Shimer (2005a). We will contrast these facts with the standard model￿ s implications
in the following section.
Table 1 also highlights the importance of choosing the appropriate temporal aggregation
scheme. Although a complete rendering of the monthly transition histories compared to simple
arithmetic averaging results in two strongly correlated series (the correlation between u!e and
u!e* is 0.99 and e!u and e!u* is 0.91), the relative variation changes signi￿cantly. With
aggregations constructed according to (12) and (13), quarterly separations are more volatile
than quarterly job ￿ndings. It is crucial, however, to keep in mind that the relative variation
reversal is a by-product of temporal aggregation. It does not imply that higher-frequency
￿ uctuations in unemployment are dominated by separations.
4 Results
In this section, we explore the cyclical properties of the search model with two sets of simulation
results. First, we subject the model to solely a labor productivity shock, holding allocative
e¢ ciency and job destruction constant. This experiment provides a direct comparison to the
standard labor market search model as in Shimer (2005a). The second simulation incorporates
the allocative e¢ ciency and job destruction shocks, with all three governed by a VAR(1) process.
Before presenting our results, we brie￿ y describe the calibration of our model.
4.1 Calibration
With a large empirical literature to draw upon and stationary labor market variables at hand,
we combine micro-evidence with long-run data averages to calibrate the steady state values
of the exogenous shocks and the technology/preference parameters. We begin by setting the
steady state values of the labor market variables, Nt, Vt, and Ut, equal to the corresponding
￿rst moments of the data: N = 0:943, V = 0:048, and U = 0:057. Given these values, we
observe that the steady-state version of the equation-of-motion for employment (7),
￿N = ￿V ￿U1￿￿; (14)
12sharply restricts the steady state values of the shocks, ￿t and ￿t, and the matching technology
parameter, ￿. We set ￿ equal to 0:28, which is the value used by Shimer (2005a).9 The steady
state rate of job separation is chosen to be 6:9 percent of total employment per quarter, or
￿ = 0:069, which is the implied quarterly average of job separation probabilities previously
discussed. Under these settings, the steady state employment condition (14) subsequently pins
down the steady state allocative e¢ ciency level: ￿ = 1:056. These parameters imply an average
vacancy duration, (M=V )
￿1 ; of 0:85 quarters or about 76 days, which is in the neighborhood
of the value, although a bit higher, than that reported by van Ours and Ridder (1992) using
data from the Dutch economy. The implied unemployment duration is 0:98 quarters, or about
12:7 weeks, which is consistent with U.S. data.
Without loss of generality, we normalize the steady state of inferred aggregate output to
one, ZN = 1, yielding steady-state labor productivity Z = 1=N = 1:06. Under this assumption,
the steady state resource constraint becomes
C + ￿U + ￿V = 1:
Note that in the absence of search and recruiting costs, i.e. ￿ = ￿ = 0, labor productivity
reduces to the traditional de￿nition of the average product of labor. Steady state labor pro-
ductivity equals C￿1 in that case. (Recall that we must proxy consumption with aggregate
output, or real GDP.) In the presence of search and recruiting costs, our imputed output mea-
sure somewhat deviates from measured real GDP, but we anticipate that the magnitude of the
di⁄erence will be small, with the settings of parameters ￿ and ￿ largely determining the gap.
Unlike the model￿ s other parameters, independent evidence regarding these two parameters is
scarce to non-existent. We follow Andolfatto (1996) in assuming that steady state recruiting
expenditures are one percent of output, or ￿V = 0:01, implying ￿ = 0:206. We assume that
steady state search costs for workers are also one percent of aggregate output, ￿U = 0:01,
yielding ￿ = 0:176. The steady state value of consumption, C, is therefore 0:98, or 98 percent
of output.
9This is at the low end of the estimates surveyed by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). In our robustness
section we allow for variations in this parameter.
13Table 2: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Source
￿ 0.99 4% interest
￿ 0.28 Shimer (2005a)
￿ 1.25 Merz (1995)
￿ 0.1762 1% of Output
￿ 0.2056 1% of Output
￿ss 1.0561 uss and vss
zss 1.0602 Avg. Output = 1
￿ss 0.0609 Shimer (2005b)
Next, we consider the two preference parameters, ￿ and ￿, the subjective discount factor and
the Frisch elasticity of the labor supply, respectively. We choose ￿ = 0:99 to be consistent with
a steady-state risk-free real interest rate of 4 percent. We follow Merz￿ s (1995) interpretation
of the empirical literature and choose ￿ = 1:5 for the Frisch elasticity. Table 2 summarizes our
calibration. In section 6, we consider di⁄erent values of ￿ and ￿.
To calibrate the shock process, we ￿rst de￿ne the data series that comprise the VAR(1)
speci￿cation. Recall that the job separation probability series is taken from Shimer (2005b),
corrected for time aggregation, and that the productivity shock, Zt, is measured by the real
output per person in the nonfarm business sector reported by the BLS. Observe that resource
constraint along with the data on Vt, Ut; and Ct also de￿nes the period-t productivity shock as
follows:
Zt =
Ct + ￿(1 ￿ Nt) + ￿Vt:
Nt
(15)
Since we have reported cyclical properties of U.S. labor market data relative to the o¢ cial BLS
measure of nonfarm business sector labor productivity for reporting consistency, it is natural
to measure Zt by the BLS series rather than what is implied by (15). However, it is comforting
to note that the correlation between this series and the BLS series is nearly perfect ￿0:998,
speci￿cally.10
10The correlation between H-P detrended measures is 0:869.
14To measure the allocative e¢ ciency shocks, we use job ￿nding probabilities and the matching
function. Recall that total ￿ ow into employment in a given period is dictated by the matching
function, (3), which we can rewrite in the following way:
￿tV ￿
t (1 ￿ Nt)
1￿￿ = ￿tV ￿
t (1 ￿ Nt)
￿￿ (1 ￿ Nt) = Pr(u ! e) ￿ (1 ￿ Nt): (16)
In words, total number of matches is equivalent to the job ￿nding probability multiplied by the
number of unemployed workers. This decomposition along with data on Vt, Ut; and Pr(u ! e)
identi￿es a time series for ￿t. In principle, our identi￿cation of ￿t is a⁄ected by the matching
function parameter ￿. In section 6 we conduct a robustness check, which shows that our
conclusions remain intact under di⁄erent values of ￿: 11
We depict the detrended time series for Zt, ￿t, and ￿t in Figure 1. Knowing that productivity
is strongly procyclical, we infer from the ￿gure that allocative e¢ ciency and job separation are
both countercyclical. The contemporaneous correlations of ￿t and ￿t with Zt are ￿0:37 and
￿0:55, respectively. Allocative e¢ ciency and job destruction shocks show more volatility than
Zt. The countercyclicality of ￿t follows from the the fact that market tightness, Vt=Ut, is
signi￿cantly procyclical and more volatile than our measure of job ￿nding, Pr(u ! e). To see
this, observe that (16) implies ￿t = Pr(u ! e)=[Vt=Ut]￿. Although the job ￿nding probability
is procyclical and volatile, it is not enough so to o⁄set the e⁄ects of market tightness.
We also want to see whether the inferred series of ￿t and ￿t imply reasonable ￿ uctuations
in unemployment. Figure 2 compares the actual unemployment rate with the unemployment
rate implied by the shocks depicted in Figure 1 and inferred using the equation of motion (7).
Figure 2 reveals that the shocks we use to estimate the VAR(1) lead to cyclical unemployment
dynamics that are virtually identical to those of actual unemployment.
Finally, with these data series, we estimate the coe¢ cients of A and ￿ using the usual
equation-by-equation OLS procedure. Estimates of A and ￿ are as follows:
11One could argue that ￿t is picking up the error term in the estimation of the aggrgate matching function,
and hence it should be orthogonal to labor market variables. However, we believe that ￿t is omitted in these
estimations and therefore estimates of ￿ could be biased. This is another motivation for checking our conclusions






























Next we turn to the simulation details of our two main experiments.
4.2 Simulating the Benchmark Economy
Before analyzing the multiple shock search model, we wish to establish the correspondence
between our discrete-time, centralized model economy and the continuous-time, decentralized
version of the standard model used by Shimer (2005b). To do this, we simulate the model with
constant job destruction and allocative e¢ ciency (￿ and ￿), but allow labor productivity, Zt,
to vary stochastically as the only source of exogenous variation. Speci￿cally, we set ￿t and ￿t
to their steady state values for all t (given in Table 2) and we assume that Zt follows a ￿rst-
order autoregressive process such that the standard deviation and the ￿rst-order autocorrelation
match the corresponding moments in the data.
Our general solution algorithm is based on Christiano (2002) and relies on the linearized ￿rst-
order condition (9). We posit linear decision rules for log deviations of the endogenous variables
Vt, Nt+1; and Ct around their respective steady states as a function of Nt and et = (Zt;￿t;￿t).
In the benchmark model, the exogenous state consists of only Zt.
Table 3 presents sample moments computed from 100 simulations of the model economy
where each simulation is 500 periods in length. To facilitate comparison with Table 1, each
variable is detrended using H-P ￿lter with smoothing parameter of 105. We can summarize this
table with three broad ￿ndings. First, vacancies and market tightness (v/u) are signi￿cantly
procyclical, and unemployment is countercyclical. Second, the Beveridge curve relationship is
consistent with the benchmark model, as shown by the negative correlation between unemploy-
ment and vacancies of ￿0:846. Finally, variation in the labor market variables is much less
than the underlying variation in productivity.
16Table 3: Simulations of Benchmark Economy
u v v/u u!e e!u z
Standard Dev. 0:005 0:016 0:020 0:006 0:000 0:020
Autocorrelation 0:900 0:845 0:910 0:910 1:000 0:880
Cross Correlations
u ￿0:846 ￿0:913 0:085 0:000 ￿0:890
v 0:989 0:989 0:000 0:996
v/u 1:000 0:000 1:000
u!e 0:000 1:000
e!u 0:000
This last observation provides the thrust of Shimer￿ s (2005b) argument that the standard
search model lacks the mechanisms that enable it to amplify realistically sized productivity
shocks to produce the extent of variation in vacancies, unemployment, and market tightness
observed in the data. The third rows of Table 1 and Table 3 con￿rm this point. Therefore,
we conclude that the model with only productivity shocks behaves similarly to the criticized
search model, even though we focus on the social planner￿ s problem. In what follows, we refer
to this discrepancy between the standard model and the data as the ampli￿cation puzzle:
4.3 Simulating the Multiple Shock Economy
We now focus on the model where the exogenous state space contains the full set of shocks:
(Zt;￿t;￿t). Having introduced two additional shocks to the model, we expect to resolve the
ampli￿cation puzzle to some extent. To help gauge the contribution of the two additional
shocks, we report the moments in a fashion similar to Table 1 and 3. Table 4 presents sample
averages of moments from 100 simulations of the model economy, where each simulation is 500
periods in length. Once again, we report the percentage deviations from trend.
17Table 4: Simulations of Multiple Shock Economy
u v v/u u!e e!u (￿) ￿ z
Standard Dev. 0:073 0:076 0:032 0:054 0:109 0:051 0:019
Autocorrelation 0:600 0:514 0:335 0:782 0:842 0:807 0:870
Cross Correlations
u 0:908 ￿0:134 0:628 0:758 0:690 ￿0:548
v 0:291 0:785 0:721 0:782 ￿0:346
v/u 0:423 ￿0:023 0:274 0:434
u!e 0:764 0:987 ￿0:254
e!u (￿) 0:816 ￿0:542
￿ ￿0:345
The simulation results from the multiple-shock economy are surprising. As expected, we
observe substantially more volatility in all key variables, especially Vt and Ut. However, as the
cross correlations in Table 4 show, the model correctly implies countercyclical unemployment
only at the expense of signi￿cantly countercyclical behavior for vacancies. Therefore, the ad-
ditional volatility is accompanied by an incorrect Beveridge curve relationship: The correlation
between vacancies and unemployment is 0:908. Note that the incorrect Beveridge curve rela-
tionship is due to counterfactual behavior in vacancy creation, not unemployment. To sum up,
adding two plausible channels of exogenous ￿ uctuation partly resolves the ampli￿cation puzzle,
but produces seriously counterfactual cyclical features for some of the key endogenous variables.
5 Discussion: Accounting for Imperfection
It is no surprise that the multiple-shock approach produces better results in terms of the
volatility of endogenous variables. Beyond that, our results provide more questions than
answers. What are the reasons behind conterfactual implications? To gain some traction on
this question, we conduct an experiment. In what follows, we compute the innovations of the
shock process that would be obtained if the actual data-generating process were indeed the
18multiple-shock model.12 We then analyze the characteristics of the realized shocks to form
economically meaningful conjectures for the counterfactual behavior implied by the simulation
in the preceding section. The exercise is a diagnostic one￿ one that leads us to potentially
productive avenues for future research.
5.1 Perfect-Fit Experiment
Because we use a linearization-based algorithm to solve for the economy￿ s decision rules, solving
the exogenous shock series that generates a perfect ￿t of the multiple-shock model requires only
a straightforward inversion of the log-linearized model.
The solution procedure generates log deviations of endogenous variables around the steady
state as a function of Nt and et = (Zt;￿t;￿t). Dropping the time subscript to denote steady
state values and using lower-case letters to represent the corresponding log-deviation from



























. A similar transformation can be applied to the VAR(1) shock
process:
e et+1 = Ae et + ~ "t+1 (18)
where e et = (~ zt; e ￿t;e ￿t)
0, A is a 3￿3 matrix of constants, and ~ "t is trivariate normal with E~ "t = 0
and E["t"0
t] = ￿.
Given values for the parameters comprising the VAR(1) matrix of coe¢ cients A, the decision
rules mapping the period t state (nt;e et) into values for the endogenous variables (nt+1;vt;ct)
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where the ￿ parameters comprise expressions of technology and preference parameters. Easy
12This exercise is partly in the spirit of Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) and Ingram, Kocherlakota, and
Savin (1994).
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Given data series for employment, vacancies, and consumption, the left-hand side of this ex-
pression is a vector of constants in any given period. Then, the matrix b ￿ is easily inverted to
yield the period-t realization of the forcing process: (~ zt; e ￿t;e ￿t). Our estimates in (17) and the
mapping in (20) yield a unique set of realizations for (~ zt; e ￿t;e ￿t).
Figure 3 plots the implied time series, and Table 5 summarizes basic statistics about the
required shocks for a perfect ￿t.13 We see that the standard deviation of allocative e¢ ciency
and job destruction are both required to be much larger than that of labor productivity to
ensure a perfect ￿t to the data. More interestingly, the implied job destruction and allocative
e¢ ciency shocks are both signi￿cantly procyclical. Recall that section 4 led to a di⁄erent result.
We computed the ￿t and ￿t series using the data on job ￿nding and job separation probabilities,
and they showed signi￿cant countercyclicality over the cycle. However, it is important to note
that the computations in section 4 and the exercise here give us two di⁄erent set of objects.
In section 4, we use minimal theory to measure Zt, ￿t, and ￿t so that we can estimate the
VAR(1) that governs these shocks. On the other hand, our perfect-￿t experiment in this
section generates a set of realizations for Zt, ￿t, and ￿t that have to satisfy all the ￿rst-order
conditions, and also generate the observed U.S. data. Therefore, these two sets of (Zt,￿t, ￿t)
are conceptually very di⁄erent.
13Once again, all variables are log-deviations from their H-P trend, with smoothing parameter, 10
5.
20Table 5: Required Shocks for a Perfect Fit
Z ￿ ￿
Standard Deviation 0:016 0:820 0:745




Perhaps a more useful way of diagnosing Mortensen-Pissarides search model is to follow
Chari, Kehoe and McGratten (2007) and decompose the ￿ uctuations in employment into the
components that are due to di⁄erent shocks. Speci￿cally, we deduce the variation in employment
that can be accounted for by each of the shock variables. To do this we take the sources of
variation that were used to generate the perfect-￿t, and expose them to the model, one at a
time. The remaining shocks are set equal to steady state values in each period.
The results of this exercise is presented are Figure 4. First, consider the model with labor
productivity as the only exogenous variable. Observe that the employment response to a la-
bor productivity shock alone is virtually ￿ at at zero, implying that labor productivity shocks
have little explanatory power in the labor market search model. This echoes Shimer￿ s cri-
tique (2005a). Unlike the Z-only case, both the ￿-only and ￿-only cases generate signi￿cant
employment volatility. Note however, that they exhibit divergent cyclical characteristics. The
allocative e¢ ciency shock generates procyclical employment pattern, whereas the job destruc-
tion alone creates a countercyclical employment pattern. We conclude that allocative e¢ ciency
is a productive source of exogenous variation in rectifying the qualitative and quantitative prob-
lems of the Mortensen-Pissarides labor market search model.
In a similar vein we can further evaluate the model by sequentially feeding two of the three
shocks into the model. The results of this exercise are presented in Figure 5. First consider the
experiment which exposes the model to only the ￿t and ￿t that we backed out from the perfect-
￿t exercise (i.e. exclude Zt). The implied behavior of employment is virtually indistinguishable
from actual employment behavior. This serves as a convincing restatement of the result in the
previous experiment in which employment showed no response to a labor productivity shock
21alone. The remaining two experiments exclude ￿t and ￿t in turn. The latter one generates
the appropriate cyclical employment response. In other words using just labor productivity
and allocative e¢ ciency shocks allows us to generate nearly the same behavior as the ￿-only
shock in the previous experiment. This gives more support for our conclusion that matching
e¢ ciency is an important ingredient to labor market dynamics.
This perfect-￿t exercise has so far showed us how the shocks must have behaved if we take
our model as the true data-generating process. There is obviously nothing surprising with the
implied series on labor productivity, Zt. On the other hand, since we are able to identify ￿t
only indirectly when we use restrictions from the model, we can be agnostic about the true
nature of the allocative e¢ ciency shock. However, the implied job destruction series poses
a signi￿cant challenge. It is impossible to reconcile a procyclical job destruction shock with
the existing evidence (Blanchard and Diamond (1990), Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), Davis,
Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) and Shimer (2005a)). Moreover, our decomposition suggests
that this component accounts for a signi￿cant fraction of the ￿ uctuations in employment alone.
Since we cast this experiment as a diagnostic procedure, we need an answer to the following
question: What are the properties of the multiple-shock search model that require it to produce
a procyclical and volatile job separation rate to account for U.S. employment ￿ uctuations? A
successful answer to this puzzle requires a deeper understanding of the mechanics of the standard
labor market search model.
5.2 Diagnosing the Search Model
We begin our analysis by identifying the model mechanisms and the cyclical properties of the
observed data that produce the results highlighted above. Motivated by the persistent and
procyclical movements of labor productivity, Zt, we ￿rst trace out the dynamics generated by
the search model in response to a sudden and persistent increase in labor productivity, holding
constant allocative e¢ ciency, ￿t, and the rate of job separation, ￿t. In doing so, we make use
of the equations (6), (7), and (9).
Consider ￿rst the e⁄ects of an innovation to labor productivity. By signaling greater fu-
ture productivity [as captured by the term Z0 in the intertemporal e¢ ciency condition (9)], it
encourages an immediate spike in vacancies, as ￿rms respond to the higher anticipated produc-
22tivity bene￿ts of ￿lled positions. This immediately increases the vacancy-unemployment ratio.
In addition, new matches form in the next period, thereby increasing employment and reducing
unemployment. These e⁄ects are summarized by an increasing vacancy-unemployment ratio.
The productivity innovation also sets in motion forces that oppose the increasing vacancy-
unemployment ratio. To see this, one ￿rst notes that the resource constraint (6) translates
the anticipated increase in future productivity and employment into higher future consump-
tion through a more rapid output ￿ ow.14 The increases in employment and consumption
subsequently reduce the representative worker￿ s marginal willingness to substitute nonmarket





decreases in equation (9). This o⁄sets, to some extent, an
individual ￿rm￿ s vacancy-creation motive and the subsequent increase in employment. Further-
more, the draining of the unemployment pool persists and o⁄sets some of the future bene￿ts






term represents the additional future recruiting costs exacted by the depleted stock of search-
ing workers on the right-hand side of (9). Recall that this last quantity (or more precisely,
its absolute value) is directly proportional to the vacancy-unemployment ratio￿ a proxy for the
"tightness" of the labor market. The data, as we have seen, display extremely large procyclical
variation in this ratio, which casts doubt on the model￿ s ability to produce the required cyclical
variation in response to realistically sized shocks to labor productivity.
By allowing both matching e¢ ciency and the job separation rate to vary over the business
cycle, the preceding diagnostic procedure responds to this tension by equating the observed
vacancy-unemployment ratio with the socially optimal one in each period. The highly variable
and procyclical allocative e¢ ciency shock, ￿t, implied by this exercise (Table 5 and Figure 3)
e⁄ectively increases the expected gains of vacancy creation in response to exogenous increases in
labor productivity, thus generating additional vacancies while also increasing the rate at which
unemployed workers meet up with them. As a result, the ￿ ow of workers from unemployment
to employment increases, reducing the unemployment pool. The increase in vacancies, coupled
with falling unemployment, gives an additional upward push to the vacancy-unemployment
ratio, moving the economy along the Beveridge curve in accordance with the data. Although
14The sum of search and vacancy-creation costs, ￿(1 ￿ Nt)+￿Vt, is small, and the increase in vacancy-creation
costs ￿Vt counteracts the reduction in search costs, ￿(1 ￿ Nt).
23the vacancy-unemployment ratio moves decidedly in the proper direction, it cannot do so with
a sizeable increase in net employment, all else constant. However, given that the aggregate
employment (or unemployment) data reveal relatively small period-to-period changes, the model
requires a much larger employment out￿ ow to restock the unemployment pool depleted by the
enhanced matching e¢ ciency. This element could only be provided by the required procyclical
rate of job separation, ￿t, (Table 5 and Figure 3). Recall that Figures 4 and 5 indicate
that movements in ￿t need an o⁄setting movement in ￿t to generate empirically consistent
employment ￿ uctuations.
In light of Figures 4 and 5 we can also claim that without a movement in ￿t or ￿t the e⁄ects
of Zt could end up being negligible. This is consistent with Shimer (2005a). However, our
perfect-￿t experiment and the discussion above suggest that we cannot expect to have enough
variation in vacancies (hence market tightness) to warrant the observed level of variation in
the data. This variation is mostly achieved through high-frequency movements in ￿t and an
o⁄setting e⁄ect of ￿t to generate enough churning consistent with relatively small movements
in employment between two consecutive periods.
5.3 A Resolution: Procyclical Reallocation
At this point we could accept the results of our experiment with a claim that matching e¢ ciency
and job separation are indeed both strongly procyclical. To our knowledge, there is no direct
evidence on the e¢ ciency of labor market matching over the business cycle. There is some em-
pirical evidence by Bowlus (1995) showing that mismatch has cyclical characteristics, increasing
during recessions. We could simply argue that procyclical matching e¢ ciency is a more reason-
able outcome than the alternatives. As we have already stated however, sharply procyclical job
separation is strongly at odds with existing data. To jointly accept both outcomes would be
the equivalent of believing in an extraordinarily unlikely draw from the distribution of shocks.
Instead, we look for economic meaning in the results to conjecture a plausible solution to the
puzzle, and by doing so, propose potentially productive modi￿cations to the standard labor
market search framework. We begin with a brief discussion of the literature regarding the
ampli￿cation puzzle.
Recent studies have attributed the ampli￿cation puzzle to di⁄erent characteristics of the
24standard labor market search model with only a productivity shock. Shimer (2005a) and Hall
(2005) suggest that the underlying wage determination mechanism is the reason for the lack
of ampli￿cation in these models. Hall (2004, 2005), Shimer (2004), and Kennan (2007) build
on this presumption and introduce wage rigidity either exogenously or through an endogenous
mechanism, such as asymmetric information.
As argued extensively by Mortensen and Nagypal (2007), however, wage rigidity per se
is not the reason for ampli￿cation. For instance, even in a case where the workers￿lack of
bargaining strength leads to constant wages that are equal to the reservation wage (i.e., the
value of leisure), the variability of labor market variables relative to productivity is an order
of magnitude smaller than the data (Mortensen and Nagypal (2007)). Moreover, Pissarides
(2008) argues that the empirical evidence in favor of wage rigidity over the cycle is not true for
newly created matches, which is the important margin for job creation in the canonical labor
market search model. Therefore, we conclude that our formulation of the problem as a social
planner￿ s problem, thereby ignoring wage determination, is not crucial for understanding the
ampli￿cation puzzle.
Several recent studies also aim to provide a mechanism that can amplify the e⁄ects of
business cycles on unemployment and vacancies (Hagedorn and Manovskii (2007), Krause and
Lubik (2006), Nagypal (2006), Silva and Toledo (Forthcoming) and Tasci (2007)). Hage-
dorn and Manovskii (2007) use an unrealistically high value of nonmarket activity to generate
ampli￿cation, which also implies an excessive unemployment response to a slight increase in
unemployment compensation (Costain and Reiter (2008) and Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante
(2006)). Silva and Toledo (Forthcoming)￿ s result depends on a particular constellation of pa-
rameter values for separation and hiring and training costs that is hard to quantify empirically.
Introducing a labor force participation decision or the possibility of job-to-job transitions
breaks the tight link between job matching and job dissolution in the standard setup by creating
an additional pool of workers to draw upon to ￿ll newly created vacancies. Whether these ￿ ows
are signi￿cant is an empirical question. Although the distinction between unemployment and
labor force nonparticipation is fairly vague, there is substantial evidence pointing to substantial
job-to-job movements. Nagypal (2004) and Shimer (2005b) argue that job-to-job transitions are
crucial for cyclical worker reallocation. Exploiting dependent interviewing methods introduced
25in the CPS in 1994, Fallick and Fleischman (2004) ￿nd that these ￿ ows are large: on average
2.6% of employed workers change employers each month. Moreover, job-to-job transitions
are procyclical. This particular ￿ ow cannot be analyzed by standard search models. Thus,
on-the-job search provides a natural research avenue to pursue. Krause and Lubik (2006),
Nagypal (2006), and Tasci (2007) are examples of this approach. Recently, Ramey (2008) also
argues that endogenous separations accompanied by on-the-job search could improve the ￿t of
the model to a large extent.
The channel through which on-the-job search creates more ￿ uctuations in the standard
model￿ s key variables without resorting to counterfactual job separations is straightforward.
Consider the case in the preceding section. Following a positive productivity shock, labor
demand expands and ￿rms create vacancies. The additional vacancies subsequently imply
a higher job ￿nding rate and lower unemployment. If all new matches form through the
pool of unemployed workers, an increasingly small pool of unemployed workers dampens the
incentive for ￿rms to further create vacancies. This is the mechanism in the model that we
emphasized in the previous section, which gives rise to counterfactual job separations to account
for unemployment ￿ uctuations in the data. In Nagypal (2006), information frictions generate a
bias for ￿rms to hire employed workers, which reduces the counter e⁄ect. Alternatively, in Tasci
(2007), the underlying match heterogeneity in the form of symmetric incomplete information
about the quality of the job-worker match implies that there is a measure of workers employed
in relatively low quality matches during expansions. These workers have the incentive to accept
better quality matches and provide the additional incentive for ￿rms to post vacancies.
6 Robustness
This section explores the robustness of our results. We check whether our ￿ndings vary
with the elasticity of the matching function and the elasticity of the labor supply, ￿ and ￿,
respectively. Recall that we calibrated ￿ to be 1:25 based on Merz (1995). Since this parameter
determines the response of the household labor supply to changes in productivity, it is important
to know whether our results are dependent on a particular choice. Similarly, we change the
parameter value governing the elasticity of matching and check whether it fundamentally alters
26our conclusions. We present the key statistics from our robustness check in Table 6. These
statistics include standard deviations of unemployment,vacancies, and vacancy-unemployment
ratio and their correlations to the productivity shocks.
Our alternatives for ￿ are 2 and 0:5. Simulating the multiple-shock economy with these
parameter values changes virtually nothing. The model continues to generate more volatility in
labor market variables than the benchmark single-shock economy. Moreover, the counterfactual
cyclical implications remain in place with countercyclical job vacancies and a positive correlation
between unemployment and vacancies. When we repeat our perfect-￿t experiment, the model
continues to require procyclical job separation and allocative e¢ ciency shocks.15
Table 6: Robustness Checks for Various ￿ and ￿.
￿ = 0:4 ￿ = 0:5 ￿ = 0:28 ￿ = 0:5 ￿ = 2
￿ = 1:25
std(u) 0:069 0:061 0:073 0:070 0:0740
std(v) 0:078 0:079 0:076 0:077 0:3075
std(v=u) 0:025 0:028 0:032 0:030 0:032
corr(u;v) 0:947 0:947 0:908 0:921 0:907
corr(u;z) -0:547 -0:539 ￿0:548 ￿0:540 ￿0:550
corr(v;z) ￿0:443 ￿0:509 ￿0:346 ￿0:372 ￿0:346
Since ￿ = 0:28 lies at the lower end of the matching function estimates that Petrongolo
and Pissarides (2001) provide, we consider higher values. Increasing the value of ￿ from 0:28
to 0:4 and 0:5 slightly alters our results, generating even less volatility in unemployment and
market tightness. This is expected, given that ￿ also determines the share of the match surplus
extracted by workers in the decentralized analogue. As the ￿rm￿ s share falls, vacancy-creation
becomes less sensitive to the underlying changes in the value of a match. However, the shocks
required for a perfect ￿t continue to exhibit procyclical job separation and allocative e¢ ciency.16
Hence, we conclude that our results remain in place for reasonably di⁄erent values of the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply and the elasticity of the matching function.
15Results are not shown here but are available upon request.
16Results are not shown here but are available upon request.
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We have extended a basic discrete-time version of the Mortensen-Pissarides model of labor
market search to include multiple and mutually correlated sources of exogenous variation. We
use our extended model to investigate the model￿ s well-known tendency to underpredict the
volatility of key labor market variables. The shock process comprises labor productivity,
job separation, and matching e¢ ciency and is partly estimated using data on job ￿nding and
separation probabilities for the U.S. economy. Although our model generates more volatility,
it has counterfactual implications for the cyclicality of unemployment and vacancies.
We exploit the degrees of freedom facilitated by the multiple-shock structure of our model
to uncover the mechanics, or lack thereof, that generate the empirically implausible implica-
tions. This leads us to our second exercise, which forces the model to be the data-generating
process, allowing us to uncover the necessary realizations of all three shocks. We show that the
Mortensen-Pissarides labor market search model requires signi￿cantly procyclical and volatile
matching e¢ ciency and job separations to simultaneously account for high procyclical varia-
tions in the job ￿nding probability as well as the relatively small net employment change in
the data. Hence, the standard Mortensen-Pissarides labor market search model is more funda-
mentally ￿ awed than its inability to amplify shocks would suggest. This leads us to conclude
that the model lacks mechanisms to generate procyclical matching e¢ ciency and labor force
reallocation. The conclusion points us in the direction of models that allow job-to-job transi-
tions as a productive ￿rst step in amending the standard model. We also show that variation
in job separations and matching e¢ ciency account for most of the employment ￿ uctuations,
suggesting that endogenous separations and cyclical mismatch could be the key feature of an
improved model. Our hope is to stimulate further research into the nature of our ￿ndings
and to generate even richer theoretical structures that will eventually give us a more thorough
picture of aggregate labor market ￿ uctuations.
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